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JEROME FRAN'S VIEWS ON TRIAL BY JURY
JULIUS PAUL6
I must say that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost
anything short of sickness and death.--JumE LEARNED HAND.
As one who professes to be a thoroughgoing democrat, Jerome Frank
has a respect for the historical basis of trial by jury, but as a lawyer and
now a judge, he finds the jury system not only a grossly inefficient system
of finding the facts, but also a system that has dangerously outgrown its
original functions.
In most jury eases, then, the jury determines not the "facts" but
the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the suit. For the
judgment of the court follows the general verdict of the jury, so
that the verdict, since it produces a judgment which determined
the respective rights and obligations, decides the law of the par-
ticular ease. But this decision is made by persons with little
understanding of the pre-existing "rules of law" and scant will
to adhere to or employ these rules even so far as they are com-
prehended.,
This usurpation of the powers of the judge by the jury is termed "sur-
reptitious" by Frank, who finds this sleight-of-hand technique another
example of the negation of the myth of legal certainty.
The general-verdict jury-trial, in practice, negates that which the
dogma of precise legal predictability maintains to be the nature of
law. A better instrument could scarcely be imagined for achieving
uncertainty, capriciousness, lack of uniformity, disregard of former
decisions-utter unpredictability . . ..
*A.B., University of Minnesota, 1947; Ph.D., The Ohio State UniVersity, 1954.
Assistant Professor of Government, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale,
Illinois. !
1. Learned Hand. The Defciencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Mat-
ter, N.Y. City Bar Ass'n. 3 LEcTUREs ON LEGAL Topics 89, 105 (1926).
2. FRANx, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 172. (1930). In a note on the same
page, Frank adds: "In criminal cases the verdict, if for the accused, is conclusive
and, therefore, there should be little doubt that the jury, in such cases, decides the
law."
3. Id. at 172.
(28)
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But why have men who craved for certainty allowed this craving to
be placed in the hands of twelve men who are incapable of even approaching
this ideal? The answer lies in the desire for father-authority and the basic
legal myth:
For while men want the law to be father-like, aloof, stern, coldly
impartial, they also want it to be flexible, understanding, human-
ized. The judges too emphatically announce that they are serving
the first of these wants. The public takes the judges seriously,
assumes that the judges will apply hard-and-fast law to human
facts, and turns to the jury for relief from such dehumanized
justice.
... The result is that, to preserve the self-delusion of legal fixity,
tainty and impartiality, in many cases we hand over the determi-
nation of legal rights and liabilities to the whims of twelve men
casually gathered together. Seeking to escape judge-made law,
we have evolved jury-made law.'
This "jury-made" law is not the same as judge-made law. It is a unique
type of law, according to Frank's description.
Jury-made law, as compared with judge-made law, is peculiar in
form. It does not issue general pronouncements. You will not
find it set forth in the law reports or in textbooks. It does not
become embodied in a series of precedents. It is nowhere codified.
For each jury makes its own law in each case with little or no
knowledge of or reference to what has been done before or regard
to what will be done thereafter in similar cases. Yet jury law,
although not referred to as law, is real law none the less. If all
cases were general-verdict jury cases and if judges directed a ver-
dict, the law of all decided cases would be jury law.'
According to Frank, the results of this phenomenon, for the legal sys-
tem, as well as for the social order that is being deceived by this process
of jury-made law, are harmful and dangerous.
4. Id. at 175, 177.
5. Id., note at 174.
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The demand for -an impossible legal stability, resulting from an
infantile longing to find a father-substitute in the law, thus actual-
ly leads, in the use of-the jury, to a capriciousness that is unneces-
sary and socially harmful.
The jury, then, are hopelessly incompetent as fact-finders. It is
possible, by training, to improve the ability of our judges to pass
upon facts more objectively. But no one can be fatuous enougli to
believe that the entire community can be so educated that a crowd
of twelve men chosen at random can do, even moderately well, what
painstaking judges now find it difficult to do. It follows that the
us e of fact-verdicts, while it may slightly reduce the evils of the
jury system, cannot eliminate them. The jury makes the orderly
administration of justice virtually impossibleo
These are harsh words of dispraise for the jury system; yet Jerome
Frank is not a man without pity in his heart, especially for the jurors in
this inadequate system of administering justice.
Are jurors to blame when they decide cases in the ways I've de-
scribed ? I think not. In the first place, often they cannot under-
stand what the judge tells them about the legal rules. To
comPrehend the meaning of many a legal rule requires special
training. It is inconceivable that a body of twelve ordinary men,
casually gathered together for a few days, could, merely from
listening to the instructions of the judge, gain the knowledge nee-
essary to grasp the true import of the judge's words. For these
words have often acquired their meaning as the result of hundreds
of years of professional disputation in the courts. The jurors
usually are as unlikely to get the meaning of those words as if they
were spoken in. Chinese,, Sanskrit, or Choctaw. "Can anything
be more fatuous," queries Sunderland, "than the expectation that
the: law which the judge so carefully, learnedly and laboriously
expounds to the laymen in the jury box becomes operative in their
minds in true form? . . ..
6. :Id. at 178, 180-1. In a note, Frank adds: "Sunderland, who urges the
use of fact verdicts, admits that they would merely palliate the fundamental diffi-
culty." id. at 181.
7. COURTS ON TRAL. p. 116 (1949).
(Vol. 2
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But sympathy for the role that jurors are forced to play does not
exonerate the jury system from its inherent defects, which are numerous.
They are present, nonetheless, and Frank feels a strong need for exposing
these defects to public scrutiny and for suggesting reforms. The harm done
by such a system is too serious to ignore in an age such as the present one.
The jury system, praised because, in its origins, it was apparently
a bulwark against an arbitrary tyrannical executive, is today
the quintessence of governmental arbitrariness. The jury system
almost completely wipes out the principle of "equality before the
law" which the "supremacy of law" and the "reign of law" sym-
bolizes-and does so, too, at the expense of justice, which requires
fairness and competence in finding the facts in specific cases.
If anywhere we have a "government of men," in the worst sense
of that phrase, it is in the operations of the jury system.
If we want juries to act as legislators, we should tell them so.
Instead, we have the judges tell them the exact opposite. . .
Thus, the essential defects in the jury system, according to Frank's
analysis of the problem, are: usurpation of the judge's function of rule-
making; inefficiency and incompetence in finding the facts; an exaggerated
sense of a "government of men" in their usurpation of legislative functions;
and the preservation of the worst elements of court-house government.
I have told you of the excessive fighting spirit in trials which still
unfortunately dominates too much of court-house government,
and which prevents needed improvement in court-room fact-finding.
The jury helps to keep alive this fight-theory. More than anything
else in the judicial system, the jury blocks the road to better ways
of finding the facts.9
Perjured evidence is one of the major problems that Frank feels ought
to be seriously considered in any proposed jury reform, for juries "dis-
cover" the facts principally on the basis of what they hear and see in the
8. Id. at 132, 133. To Frank, who has been a staunch opponent of this type
of "government of laws," the opposite phenomenon, in this case at least, is equally
undesirable in his theory of democracy. See the preface to the sixth printing of
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND p. xxiii (1949); Ir MEN WERE ANGELS 9, 190-211
(1949); COURTS ON TRIAL 405-6 (1949).
9. Id., at 138.
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court room. How can this type of evidence be reduced or perhaps even
eliminated from the trial process? Jerome Frank suggests two devices:
pre-trial investigation and procurement of evidence by impartial govern-
ment officials for presentation to the trial court (similar to the type used
by administrative agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion); and special findings of fact by the judge himself. The first sugges.
tion irked many of Frank's critics, including Federal Judge John C. Knox,
who wrote:
Unfortunately, neither Judge Frank nor I can give any figure for
the amount of perjury there actually is, and I certainly agree there
is too much. But I myself am entirely convinced that perjury
plays a vastly less important part in our trials than does the in-
accurate testimony offered by completely honest witnesses.'"
Insofar as special findings of fact are concerned, even Frank is dubious
of the practical value of his own suggestion:
Nevertheless, to .require the trial judge to make and publish his
findings of fact will yield no panacea where, because of a conflict
in the oral testimony, the credibility of witnesses becomes crucial.
Frustration of the purpose of the requirement occurs where, as
too often happens, the judge uncritically adopts the findings
drafted by the lawyer for the winning side. For then the judge
may ostensibly make a finding of some facts of which-although
they are based on some testimony-the judge never thought, and
which, had he done his own job, he would not have included; in
that event, his finding does not represent any real inference he drew
from the evidence-does not reflect his own actual views concerning
the witnesses' credibility. With conscientious trial judges, how-
ever, the difficulty is not insurmountable."'
10. Just Justice, 216 Sat. Eve. Post 22, 72 (July 24, 1943). This article was
written as an answer to Frank's White Collar Justice, 216 id. 22, 55 (July 17,
1943).' Justice according to Frank's formula did not please his colleague, Judge
Knox, who went on to severely criticize Frank's suggestion of pre-trial procure-
ment of evidence as a dangerous administrative inroad on our legal system that
might do more harm than good. See FRANK, CounTs ON TRIAL 97-99 (1949).
11. COURTS ON TRIAL, 185. This was written sixteen years after the Saturday
Evening Post article mentioned above, and perhaps represents a view that bene.
fited from these years spent on the Federal Bench. Frank continued: "But a
graver difficulty remains: the facts, as 'found', can never be known to be the
same as the actual past facts-as what (adapting Kant's phrase) may be termed
the 'facts in themselves'. How closely the judge's 'findings' approximate those
actual facts he can never be sure-nor can anyone else." Id. at 185.
(Vol. 22
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Not only is the witnesses' credibility of importance to the judge and
the jury, but the manner in which evidence is presented by the witnesses
is sometimes a crucial part of the process of finding the facts.2-
As a result of these many defects in the jury system, Jerome Frank,
in another article, recommended the following reforms:
For the truth is that, in general, the courts don't want to know,
and won't permit themselves to learn, how juries reach their ver-
diets .... To sum up, here are the reforms I think would im-
prove our jury system:
(1) Use "special" or "fact" verdicts in most cases.
(2) Have the judge, at the trial's beginning, roughly outline the
issues for the jurors.
(3) Let the jurors take with them to the jury room a transcript of
the evidence and of the judge's charge.
(4) Supply the jury with an expert's report of complicated facts.
(5) Employ, in many cases, "special juries" composed of jurors
having a knowledge of the customs of the trade involved.
(6) Strictly enforce the ban against jurors who have defective
hearing or eyesight or who are physically or mentally ill.
(7) Require all prospective jurors to take a detailed course of
study dealing with the function of juries.
(8) Eliminate many of the "exclusionary" evidence rules.
(9) Discourage publication, in the press or on the air, of any-
thing but straight reporting of the courtroom evidence in a jury
trial, until the case ends.
12. The New York Times carried an article which included a statement by
Charles C. McCloskey, Jr., Sheriff of Chautauqua County and a former special
agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, advising law enforcement officers
who have to take the witness stand always to give strictly factual answers and
never to volunteer information either for the prosecution or the defense. "A good
case may be destroyed by a single bad impression given to the jury." He said,
"The juror is a human being, subject to the same feelings as you. He may not
like the way you part your hair or the way you walk into court, even though your
manner is strictly proper." MeCloskey also urged law enforcement officers "to
be natural" as witnesses and to remember that their role is "to collect the facts
and then present them in court impartially." New York Times, August 5, 1953, p.
82.
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Although trial by jury can be improved, in my opinion it will
remain the weakest spot in our judicial system-reform it as we
may. But the judges (like me) who want to see the civil jury
abolished and the use of the criminal jury limited, will, of course,
as long as the jury system endures, comply with their oaths of office
and strive to make the jury system work as best it can."
Some of these suggestions have found approval in other quarters.
Judge Charles Wyzanski, Jr., for instance, has written:
Indeed, except for tort cases, I find myself in agreement with Judge
Frank that the trial judge ought to use special verdicts to a much
larger extent, though it is more difficult than may at first be real-
ized to frame questions to the satisfaction of counsel and to the
comprehension of juries."
13. Something Wrong With Our Jury System, 126 Colliers 28, 64 (Dec. 9,
1950) at 29, 66. Cf. FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND, note, p. 185: "Our
complicated and cumbersome rules of evidence could be simplified immeasurably
if we did away with the jury. The hearsay rule, for instance, is largely due to
the mistrust of the jury's competence to weigh evidence." This statement was
written in 1930. Frank's ninth point of his suggested reforms, or variations of it,
has been an extremely controversial issue at all levels of our judicial system in
recent years. In respect to "trial by newspapers," see Shepherd v. Florida, 341
U.S. 50 (1951), especially Justice Jackson's concurring opinion, Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952), and Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). At
the state and local level, New York and Ohio courts have recently dealt with the
public nature of trial by jury. The Ohio Supreme Court unanimously adopted a
rule of judicial ethics (Canon No. 35 in the Adopted Canons of Judicial Ethics)
prohibiting the photographing, broadcasting or televising of proceedings of any
state court, based on recommendations of the American Bar Association and the
Ohio State Bar Association. (New York Times, January 28, 1954, p. 23). The
Ohio Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of three Cleveland Press employees
on contempt of court charges which resulted from the taking of a photograph in
a courtroom of the Cleveland Common Pleas Court, and the Ohio Supreme Court
affirmedithis decision in State v. Clifford, 162 Ohio St. 370, 123 N.E.2d 8 (1954).
The Appellate Division, First Department of the New York Supreme Court in a
3-2 decision reversed the conviction of Minot Jelke because of the exclusion of the
press and of the public during his celebrated trial on compulsory prostitution, and
this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New York in People v. Jelke, 308
N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954). This same court decided differently in the case
of the newspapers that had appealed the ban. United Press Association v. Valente,
308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954). Also, see the following notes, Duo Process
For Whom-Newspaper or Defendant, 4 STAN. L. REv. 101-11 (1951), and Free-
dom of the Press-A Menace to Justice, 37 IowA L. Ray. 249-61 (1962).
14. A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 190 Atlantic Monthly 55,
57 (July, 1952). See Frank, The Case for the Special Verdict, 32 J. AM. JuD.
Soo'y. 142 (1949); Julius Stone, Book Review of CouRTS ON TnIL., 63 IHAiv. L.
REy. 1466, 1471 (1950).
[Vol. 22
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Another member of the profession, Judge Curtis Bok of Philadelphia,
is more humble than Judge Frank in his criticism of the jury system in
America:
The jury system is not necessarily a bad system. If it fails, it will
be because it is worked at less than top capacity and intensity,
which is the reason most things fail. Even so, it might no longer be
considered flexible enough to fill the bill. In that event, legal so-
lutions will be left to judges or to fixed administrative tribunals;
but whatever happens, the social fabric will not be rent asunder.
Thus far no better guaranteed method has been found than a ver-
dict by a jury of the vicinage.-.
JURY VERDICTS AND TI-E PROBLEM OP CADI-JUSTICE
Proposals for the improvement of the administration of justice usually
include reforms in the field of jury verdicts. Jerome Frank believes that
the best suggestion is still the special (or fact) verdict, where the jury
reports its specific findings on specified issues of fact to the judge, who
then applies the appropriate legal rule. Of course, this does not eliminate
the possibility of perjured evidence, or the fallible elements of the human
mind, whether it be the judge's or the jurors'. But at least the false ap-
pearance that a jury gives of finding the facts can be partially alleviated.
Perhaps next to the special verdict, Frank would regard the most im-
portant element in jury reform that is practical and feasible at the present
time to be the training of future jurors. Yet, regardless of the kind or the
degree of jury reform, Frank does not believe it is possible to establish a
perfectly desirable jury system, short of its total abolition.6 The "perfect
15. The Jury System in America, 278 AlNALS 92 (May, 1953), p. 96. The
earlier Jerome Frank would have vehemently stressed the point that the jury
system was able to achieve plasticity and flexibility, but only by circumvention
of its original aims. But after thirteen years on the Federal Bench, Judge Frank
is still critical of the jury system, but also more practical in his basic analysis
of the jury. Unlike his earlier criticism, he is no longer content with a complete
defloration of the system, but recognizes the human elements in the picture, and
the necessity for practical solutions.
16. "Were all those reforms adopted, trials by jury would be less dangerous
to litigants than they now are; but I think they would still be far less desirable
than jury-less trials before well trained honest trial judges." CoURTS ON TRIA,
p. 145. Desirability is one thing and practicality quite another; Jerome Frank
as judge realizes the limitations under which he labors, although the jury is not
one of them. Judge Frank is an appellate judge.
8
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jury" is an impossibility, in view of the limitations of the human mind
(especially memory), and the circumstances that surround any type of
judicia! trial.-'
Jerome Frank characterizes the jury system in America as the (adi
system of justice at its maximum and its worst. By Cadi-justice, he means
the use of one man or a group of men serving as both fact-finder and witness-
audience; the term Cadi derives from Islamic practice.'s The Cadi element
in our present jury system, in the opinion of Frank, would be impossible to
eliminate. All that we can do is to be more aware of Cadi-justice as it really
operates in courthouse government, understand its true nature, use it more
efficiently and, if and where possible, improve it.19
1
17. Cf., the story related by Governor Goodwin J. Knight of California on
the "perfect jury": "... It seems that a judge got tired of the hemming and
hawing that a jury of laymen was likely to engage in; so he drew up a panel of
twelve lawyers. Being experienced in the law and in logic, they would surely get
to the point immediately and return an intelligent verdict in record time. How-
ever, the jury, once it had heard all the evidence in the case and retired to ponder
it, was out for an extraordinarily long time. Finally a bailiff came in from the
jury room. The judge asked eagerly, 'Have they reached a verdict yet?' 'Reached
a verdict?' said the bailiff. 'They haven't finished yet with the nominating speeches
for foreman.' . . ." Ernest Havemann, California's "Excellency" Excels at Jokes
as Well as Politics, 36 Life 117, (Mar. 29, 1954).
18. The Problem of "Cadi-justice" and the "Cadi" elements in both the judge
and the jury is thoroughly discussed in Frank, Are Judges Human? 80 U. PA. L.
REv. 17, 233, at 24-31 (1931). Whereas Frank regards the jury as the Cadi ele-
ment in American justice, Roscoe Pound and other leading figures in American law
regard the administrative tribunal as the best example of "Cadi-justice" in the
United States. On the "Kadi" elements in Supreme Court litigation, see Frank-
furter, J. in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1948).
19. Cf. Max Weber: "The 'rational' interpretation of law on the basis of
strictly formal conceptions stands opposite the kind of adjudication that is pri-
marily bound to sacred tradition. The single case that cannot be unambiguously
decided by tradition is either settled by concrete 'revelation' (oracle, prophetic
dicta, or 'ordeal that is, by 'charismatic' justice) or-and only these cases in-
terest us here-by informal judgments rendered in terms of concrete ethical or
other practical valuations. This is 'Kadi-justice,' as R. Schmidt has fittingly called
it. Or formal judgments are rendered, though not by subsumption under
rational concepts, but by drawing on 'analogies' and by depending upon and in-
terpreting concrete 'precedents.' This is 'empirical justice.' Kadi-justice knows
no reasoned judgment whatever. Nor does empirical justice of the pure type give
any reason which in our sense could be called rational. The concrete valuational
character: of Kadi-justice can advance to a prophetic break with all tradition.
Empirical justice, on the other hand, can be sublimated and rationalized into a
'technology.' All non-bureaucratic forms of domination display a peculiar co-
existence: on the one hand, there is a sphere of strict traditionalism, and, on the
other, a sphere of free arbitrariness and lordly grace. Therefore, combinations
and transitional forms between these two principles are very frequent .... "
"Bureaucracy and Law" in FROm MAx WEBER: EssAYs IN SOCIOLOGY, 216-17
(ed. and transl. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 1946).
[Vol. 22
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Perhaps, if there is any viable solution or even partial solution to the
problem of the jury system as it now exists, that solution will be found in
education, whether it be of the jurors, the judge, and/or the lawyers. While
training jurors would be a short-term process, the training of lawyers and
future judges is a much more complicated and difficult task. Invariably,
Jerome Frank's quest for legal reform ends on a note of cautious optimism.
But only when the "myth" of trial by jury and its results are fully under-
stood and eradicated in the public mind can the real job of jury reform
begin"
20. For a fuller treatment of this entire subject, see Julius Paul, "The Legal
Thinking of Jerome Frank: A Study in Contemporary American Legal Realism"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, The Ohio State Uni-
versity, 1954). A research project on trial by jury that has attracted much in-
terest in the public press and in the Senate Judiciary Committee is the University
of Chicago Law School study financed by the Ford Foundation. See Arthur
Krock, Sociological Tests in the Jury Room, New York Times, October 14, 1955,
p. 26.
*After this article had been sent to the printer, word was received of Judge
Frank's death, on January 13, 1957.-Editor.
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